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China's economy is now in the golden age with high-speed development, the
central government delegating powers and benefits, local gov ernments’ functions at
all levels are growing, the boundary of market’s self-adjusting area broads
increasingly, all indicate that the power of market is rising rapidly. However, the
reform is not a quick process, partial confusion even regression are inevitable
sometimes. As has being revealed by the North’s Paradox, Government is the main
force to define property rights and promote market-led structure which contributes
much in the process of economic development, but it may also become the ultimate
hindering forces. As the former of the rules, how to master the relationship between
athletes and referees is the import ant issue that the Government has being facing.
China's real estate market is a typical industry which develops most rapidly as whi le
as one of the most disorder  industry in recent years. High price is clearly not
conducive to economic’s sustained developm ent and the stability of society, some
government officials and interest groups are colluding with each other and creating
artificial obstacles to harm the healthy development of the market economy. As the
reason, the overheating of the real estate market is a complex result caused by the
mutual effects between the various forces and interest groups, and it is also a reverse
in the decentralized and market -oriented reform: central government's centralization
and the excessive intervention, the local governm ent’s short-term interests and the
difficulties of mutual coordination, the real estate enterprises pursuit high profits and
form the privity between each other, the consumers’ excessive speculation and reverse
expectations on the regulation and control, a nd so on. So the overheating does not
occur accidentally, but the inevitable product of conflict under the imperfect
supervision system. For the real estate market, it is very difficult to give a reasonable
description of this field by the traditional econ omic theory in which people were
modelled as the mechanical response objects, but game theory which was gestated by













interpersonal conflict between individuals in it. This paper at tempt to theorize various
individuals behavior in the real estate market as a series of game models which own
the same strain, the same logic, then find out the reasonable balanced solution in each
game and interpret the significance of these balanced points with economic reality.
The main conclusion is that: China's overheated real estate market is caused through
the rent-seeking behaviour by the narrow interest unions and power groups under the
imperfect supervision system, and also the result of cost-push and speculate-pull
power. The behavior of interests’ carved up and powers’ monopoly of the top and
middle reaches sharply pushed up the price  of the downstream. The overheating will
lead to large-scale redistribution between the society. Imperfect supervision system
prone to cause government failure. Under the state of the market and the government's
double failure, any policy that attempt to macro-control the real estate market will not
achieve the desired effect, therefore , establish a rule of game which can effectly
inhibite the transfer of benefits is the fundamental way to control overheated state of
the real estate market.
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